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NOTES
TOWARDS A PUBLIC HUMAN TISSUE
TRUST
Currently, major research institutions, graduate medical education
programs, and the federal government store over two hundred million
human tissue samples available for use in biomedical research.' This
human tissue archive continues to increase at a rate of approximately
twenty million samples per year.2 But who "owns" this tissue: the
institutions that store it, the researchers who use it, or the research
participants who voluntarily provide it? Any adequate response to this
question requires striking the best balance between two pressing
policy goals: (1) the need to ensure biomedical progress; and (2) the
need to protect the right to informed consent. Recent court decisions
all vest ownership in research institutions, while legal academics tend
to favor vesting ownership in research participants. The door remains
open to vest ownership in researchers via the proper contractual
arrangements. For reasons stated extensively below, each of these
options proves lacking. Instead, this Note aims to show that the
creation of a public human tissue trust affords the best option to
policymakers.
In Part I, this Note provides an in-depth survey of the relevant case
law. Part HI discusses the equal importance of the above policy goals
and why vesting exclusive ownership in either research institutions,
researchers, or research participants fails on policy grounds. Part III
explores the nature, mechanics, and scope of the proposed public
revocable charitable human tissue trust. Part IV proffers a public
I ELISA EISEMAN & SUSANNE B. HAGA, HANDBOOK OF HUMAN TISSUE SOURCES: A
NATIONAL RESOURCE OF HUMAN TISSUE SAMPLES 137-39 (1999).
2 Id. at 133.
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tissue trust as the best policy solution to protect the right to informed
consent.3 In Part V, this Note concludes by briefly addressing the
commercialization issues raised in Moore v. Regents of the University
of California4 and Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research
InstitUte, InC.5
1. CASE LAW
The case law here is quite sparse. Very few courts have addressed
the issue of human tissue ownership. Four cases stand out: Moore,
Greenberg, and the district court and appellate court decisions in
Washington University v. Catalona. 6 This section presents a brief
overview of each case. Moore deserves particular attention, as it
serves as the source of almost every maj or policy position in the
debate.
A. Moore
In Moore, the Supreme Court of California notably refused to find
that a conversion action lay with a patient whose tissue was the
source of a valuable cell line. John Moore argued that "defendants'
unauthorized use of his cells constitute~d] a conversion."1 While the
court recognized a cause of action concerning an alleged violation of
Moore's right to informed consent, the court reversed the court of
appeal's judgment recognizing the validity of Moore's conversion
claim. The majority concluded that Moore simply did not "retain[] an
ownership interest" in tissue excised from his body.8
In 1976, Moore had developed hairy-cell leukemia and sought
treatment at the UCLA Medical Center under Dr. David Golde. Golde
advised Moore to undergo a splenectomy to slow down the progress
of the disease. Unbeknownst to Moore and prior to his surgery, Golde
contacted researcher Shirley Quan about using portions of Moore's
spleen for possibly lucrative medical research. 9 Both Golde and Quan
"were aware that certain blood products and blood components were
3Karen Gottlieb raises the possibility of a tissue trust in a short, insightful article but
provides a prdcis as opposed to a completed proposal. See Karen Gottlieb, Human Biological
Samples and the Laws of Property: The Trust as a Model for Biological Repositories, in
STORED TISSUE SAMPLES: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 182 (Robert F.
Weir ed., 1998).
4793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
5264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
6 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006), off d, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008).
7Moore, 793 P.2d at 487.
8 Id. at 489.
9 Id. at 48 1.
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of great value in a number of commercial and scientific efforts."'0
The proposed research activities involving Moore's tissue were of no
therapeutic benefit to Moore, but "neither Golde nor Quant informed
Moore of their plans to conduct this research or requested his
permission.""
Moore proved to be an "overproducer" of T-lymphokines,'12 a
chemical released by white blood cells that aids in the fighting of
bacterial infections. 13 Isolating the genetic material that formed the
basis for the production of T-lymphokines was heretofore "akin to a
search for the proverbial needle in a haystack."'14 Due to Moore's
overproducer status, however, Golde and Quan were able to create a
T-lymphokine producing cell line from Moore's excised spleen
tissue. 15
Until 1983, Moore made several visits to the UCLA Medical
Center from his home in Seattle. During these visits, Golde took
additional tissue from Moore, primarily in the form of blood and bone
marrow aspirate. Moore consented to these procedures under the
assumption that the visits were necessary for his medical well-being.'
In fact, Golde and Quan, with full knowledge of the Regents, were
actively engaged in commercial biomedical research using Moore's
tissue. In 198 1, the Regents initiated a patent application for Moore's
cell line and listed Golde and Quan as the inventors.'" In 1984, the
Patent Office granted the application. 18 The Regents then entered into
a series of lucrative licensing agreements with various pharmaceutical
companies. 19 As of 1990, market analysts calculated the potential
value of products developed from the Moore cell line at
approximately three billion dollars.2
In 1983, Golde requested that Moore sign a consent form granting
the University of California "any and all rights [Moore or his heirs]
may have in any cell line or any other potential product which might
be developed from the blood and/or bone marrow obtained from
10 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
IIId.
12 Id. at 490-91 n.30.
13 See MOSBY MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 478 (revised ed. 1992) (for the definition of
lymphokin).
14 ROBERT F. WEIR & ROBERT S. OLICK, THE STORED TISSUE ISSUE: BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH, ETHICS, AND LAW IN THE ERA OF GENOMIC MEDICINE 157 (2004).
15 See id.
16 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 48 1.
17 Id. at 481-82.
18 Id. at 482.
19 See id.
20 WEIR & OLICK, supra note 14, at 157.
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[him]."2 Moore refused. Upon Golde's repeated requests that he sign
the consent form, Moore contacted an attorney who subsequently
discovered the existence of the cell line and patent application. On
September 11, 1984, Moore filed suit alleging numerous causes of
action. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrers across the
board, with special emphasis on the purportedly defective conversion
22
allegations. On the matter of conversion, the court of appeal
reversed.2 On defendants' appeal, the California Supreme Court
addressed two issues: (1) Golde's alleged violation of Moore's right
to informed consent, and (2) the defendants' alleged conversion of
Moore's excised tissue.
In its discussion, the court found for Moore on the first issue.
Specifically, the court held that the doctrine of informed consent for
medical procedures required Golde to disclose his ongoing research
and financial interests to Moore. Such disclosure should have
occurred both prior to Moore's splenectomy and during his
subsequent visits to the UCLA Medical Center. The court reasoned
that "a physician who does have a preexisting research interest [in a
patient] might, consciously or unconsciously, take that into
consideration in recommending [a] procedure." 24 As such, "the
physician's extraneous motivation may affect his judgment and is,
thus, material to the patient's consent.",25 Importantly, however, the
court found that only Golde, as Moore's treating physician, could
engage in the alleged violation of Moore's right to informed consent.
The Court thus sustained the trial court's demurrers for the other
defendants in this regard.2
Moore, famously, did not prevail on the second issue. In denying
Moore any ongoing "proprietary interest" in his excised cells, the
Court explicitly refused to extend conversion theory into the realm of
human tissue ownership.2 Justice Panelli, writing for the majority,
provided three ostensible reasons under existing law for why this was
the case: (1) no precedent supported Moore either directly or by
analogy ;28 (2) California public health statutes severely constrained
the possession of bio-hazardous materials ;29 and (3) Moore could
21 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Patient's Informed Consent-John Moore, in
7 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP'. 425 (1988)).
22 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 482-83.
23 Id. at 483.
24 Id. at 484.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 486-87.
27 See id. at 493.
28 Id. at 489-9 1.
29 Id. at 491-92.
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assert no proprietary interest in the Regents' patent and the products
thereby derived because Moore contributed nothing more than
"naturally occurring raw materials."3
Ultimately, however, the majority opinion turned on policy
concerns. While stopping short of a direct prohibition on excised
tissue ever counting as property, Justice Panelli argued at length that
extending conversion theory in Moore's favor would undermine
"6socially important medical research." 3 1 The majority feared that
granting research participants/patients ongoing proprietary interests in
their excised tissue could cripple the biomedical industry: "the theory
of liability that Moore urges us to endorse threatens to destroy the
economic incentive to conduct important medical research. If the use
of cells in research is a conversion, then with every cell sample a
researcher purchases a ticket in a litigation lottery." 32 The majority
further noted that rigorous enforcement of the right to informed
consent offered the best protection for Moore's interests. This option
avoided interfering with biomedical progress because it assigned no
ongoing proprietary interests to Moore.3 Hence, to safeguard "the
socially useful activities of innocent researchers," the court denied
Moore's attempt to state a cause of action for conversion.3
In his concurrence, Justice Arabian eschewed much of the
majority's instrumentalism and relied upon a much more
deontological vein of reasoning. He found Moore's attempt to secure
the validity of a conversion action was an affront to the inherent
worth and dignity of every human being. To wit, "Plaintiff has asked
us to recognize and enforce a right to sell one's own body tissue for
profit. He entreats us to regard the human vessel-the single most
venerated and protected subject in any civilized society-as equal
with the basest commercial commodity."3 On these grounds alone,
Justice Arabian argued, the court must deny the validity of Moore's
conversion claim. Justice Arabian, however, was not unmindful of the
apparent inequity of allowing the Regents et al. to retain all of the
profits ultimately derived from Moore's excised tissue. Nevertheless,
30 Id. at 493. This claim is discussed at length below in Part V.
32 Id. at 495-96.
33 See id at 494 ("Liability based upon existing disclosure obligations, rather than an
unprecedented extension of the conversion theory, protects patients' rights of privacy and
autonomy without unnecessarily hindering research.").
34 Id. at 497.
35 Id. (Arabian, J., concurrng). Here, Kant's imperative forbidding us from
treating any rational person, even ourselves, as "a means only" obviously wields deep influence
over Justice Arabian's opinion. See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 58 (T. K. Abbott trans., Prometheus Books 1987) (1785).
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the legislature, and not the courts, is the "proper deliberative forum"
to address such inequity.3 Justice Arabian concluded by suggesting
the need for a legislatively created licensing scheme to compensate all
contributors to biomedical progress.3
In his concurrence and dissent, Justice Broussard also recognized
the validity of Moore's informed consent action but parted ways with
the majority concerning the validity of Moore's conversion claim. For
Justice Broussard, given the facts of the case, a conversion action
should have lain with Moore. The key factual allegation turned on
temporality: Moore "alleged that defendants interfered with his legal
rights before his body part was removed.",38 Prior to the removal of a
"body part," i.e., tissue, the patient retains the right to control what
will become of it once removal occurs.3 Only in light of adequate
informned consent does the right to the disposition and control of
human tissue pass to researchers and research institutions.40 In sum:
Moore's right to control future uses of his excised tissue before its
removal, combined with Golde and Quan' s failure to disclose their
prior intent to make post-surgical use of said tissue, provided Moore
with an adequate cause of action under a common law conversion
theory.
Justice Broussard also chastised the majority for failing to see their
policy argument through to its logical conclusion. The majority's
policy decision to vest institutions and/or researchers with ownership
in human tissue as the best means to insure biomedical progress did
not go far enough. Specifically,
It is certainly arguable that, as a matter of policy or morality,
it would be wiser to prohibit any private individual or entity
from profiting from the fortuitous value that adheres in a part
of a human body, and instead to require all valuable excised
body parts to be deposited in a public repository which would
make such materials freely available to all scientists for the
betterment of society as a whole.4
In other words, Justice Broussard reasoned, equity might well require
the creation of a public tissue trust whereby no one individual person
36 Moore, 793 P.2d at 498 (Arabian, J., concurring).
37 See id. The scheme would presumably set fixed prices on biomnaterial contributions,
thereby avoiding the creation of a market therein.
38 Id. at 499 (Broussard, J., concurrng in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
39 Id.
40 See id.
41 Id. at 505.
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or entity would profit from the sale or commercial development of
human tissue.
In his spirited and oft-cited dissent, Justice Mosk came down
squarely on Moore's side. Justice Mosk focused primarily on the
abstract notion of property as the familiar "bundle of rights.A
Classically, a* person's retention of all of these "sticks," from
exclusive control and possession to right of sale and distribution,
conclusively vests ownership of a res or thing in that person. There
are many cases, however, where proprietary interests, i.e., "sticks,"
remain vested in an individual who does not retain the entire bundle.4
In a series of footnotes, Justice Mosk listed, among other possibilities,
the restrictions zoning laws impose on landowners, the sportsman's
right to give away captured game but not to sell it, and the right of a
person contemplating bankruptcy to sell property for market value but
not to give it away."4 Regardless of whatever property interests Moore
lacked in his tissue, "at the time of its excision he at least had the
right to do with his own tissue whatever the defendants did with it.,,45
That is, Moore was free to contract with whoever wanted to use his
tissue for commercial gain.
In his conclusion, Justice Mosk rejected the majority's policy
argument out of hand. Moore, as a victim of "blatant commercial
exploitation," clearly deserved more of a remedy than the majority
afforded him.4 Conversion theory provided Moore with the best
option. Indeed, fundamental fairness and equity dictated that Moore
be entitled to at least some modicum of compensation for his
unwitting contribution to the commercial development of his own
biological tissues. After all, Justice Mosk reasoned, but for Moore's
overproducing T-cells, no conmmercial development would have been
possible.4
In sum, Moore identifies the two policy issues at stake: (1) the
need to insure unimpeded biomedical progress; and (2) the need to
protect patient/research participants' right to informed consent. To
balance these goals, the justices proffer a panoply of policy options.
The majority does so through vesting research institutions with strong
proprietary interests in excised tissue while denying the same to
research participants. In his dissent, Justice Mosk does the opposite,
and, Justice Broussard falls somewhere in between (though closer to
42 Id. at 509 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 509- 10.
4Id. at 509, n.6, 510 n.9-10.
45 Id. at 5 1.
46 Id. at 509.
47 Id. at 511-12.
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Justice Mosk). As both Greenberg and Catalona reveal, the policy
arguments set down in Moore continue to have far-reaching
implications.
B. Greenberg
In Greenberg, the plaintiffs were families and non-profit
institutions interested in developing a diagnostic test for the fatal
genetic disorder Canavan's disease.4 In 1987, the plaintiffs contacted
a researcher who agreed to assist them. 49 The plaintiffs donated
money, and, more important, tissue samples from 'Canavan families'
around the world .5 0  The plaintiffs alleged that the original
understanding they had with the defendant researchers and research
institutions stipulated that any test developed would enter the public
domain. 51
In 1993, the research team isolated the gene responsible for the
disorder.5 In 1994, and unbeknownst to the families, the Miami
Children's Hospital Research Institute ("MCH") applied for a patent
that was granted in 1997.~ MCH proceeded to enter into a number of
exclusive licensing and royalty agreements that would sharply limit
public access to any clinical diagnostic test developed.5 In 2000, the
plaintiffs filed suit alleging numerous causes of action, including lack
of informed consent, conversion, and unjust enrichment.5
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
rejected the plaintiffs' informed consent claim out of hand. First, the
court viewed the plaintiffs as non-patient tissue donors, "and thus the
voluntary nature of their submissions warrants different treatment"
than that of patients who are also tissue donors.5 The court further
found that the standard of informed consent in cases of non-patient
tissue donation was much lower than in cases involving patient tissue
donation. In the former instance, the policy goal of insuring
biomedical progress easily trumped the need to protect informed
consent.5 Indeed, the court reasoned, public policy necessarily
precluded the disclosure of commercial interests to both donors and
49 Greenberg v. Miamni Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 106, 1066
(S.D. Fla. 2003).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1067.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See id.
15 Id. at 1068.
56 Id. at 107 1.
57 See id.
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research participants who are not patients. Such a requirement would
"chill medical research" and would provide "research subjects" with
"dead-hand control" over how "medical research progresses." 58
With regards to the conversion claim, the Greenberg court
explicitly followed Moore: "Plaintiffs have no cognizable property
interest in body tissue and genetic matter donated for research under a
theory of conversion."5 Plaintiffs fared better, however, on their
unjust enrichment claim. By "investing time and significant resources
in the race to isolate the Canavan gene," the plaintiffs apparently
bestowed a benefit on the defendants that the defendants voluntarily
accepted.6 Inequity would therefore result unless the defendants
fairly compensated the plaintiffs for the benefit received. Ultimately,
the parties settled on the issue of unjust enrichment. In exchange for
defendants permitting outside researchers "free use" of the Canavan
disease genetic sequence for non-commercial purposes, the plaintiffs
agreed to recognize MCH's exclusive licensing and royalty
agreements involving clinical tests for the disease.6 Importantly, the
plaintiffs' victory, such as it was, obviously turned here on equity
grounds as opposed to property considerations.6
Greenberg is thus notable for three reasons: (1) the court refused
to require researchers to disclose the possibility of commercialization
to providers of tissue samples who are not patients; (2) the court,
following Moore, declined to recognize the validity of a conversion
action on the part of research participants involving an alleged misuse
of their tissue; and (3) the court did recognize the validity of an unjust
enrichment claim in instances where allegedly misused tissue
donations resulted in a patented commercial product.
C. Catalona (District Court)
In Catalona, a prominent prostate researcher at Washington
University ("WU") decided to leave for Northwestern University and
wanted to take several thousand tissue samples with him.63 The
researcher, Dr. William Catalona, sought to have his former patients
vested with ongoing proprietary interests in their excised tissue.' As
58 Id. at 1070-7 1.
59 Id. at 1074.
60 Id. at 1073.
61 Joint Press Release, Canavan Foundation (Sept. 29, 2003), available at
http://www.canavanfoundation.org/newsdetai.php?id=6.
62 WEIR & OLICK, supra note 14, at 164.
63 Wash. Univ. v. catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 993 (E.D. Mo. 2006), affid, 490 F.3d
667 (8th cir. 2007), cer. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008).
64 Id.
17920091
1180 ~CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [o.5:
such, he hoped that several thousand of them would agree to
withdraw their samples from the WU biorepository and transfer
control to him. 65 WU filed for a permanent injunction prohibiting the
research participants from doing so, which the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri subsequently granted on summary
judgment.66
Ultimately, the district court denied that the research participants
retained any ongoing proprietary interests in their excised tissues and
found WU the sole owner thereof. The court's reasoning rested on
three findings: (1) that the research participants made an inter vivos
gift of their excised tissue to WU and not to Dr. Catalona;6 1 (2) that a
research participant's right to discontinue participation in research
involving his or her excised tissue should be narrowly construed ;68
and (3) that granting research participants ongoing proprietary
interests in their excised tissue would seriously undermine biomedical
progress.6
In support of its gift analysis, the court placed heavy emphasis on
the following facts. WU had retained complete and exclusive control
over the tissue samples since receiving them from the research
participants by housing the samples in its biorepositoryi' 0 WU's
intellectual property policy, known to Dr. Catalona, explicitly stated
that all "tangible research property" involved in any research funded
by an internal or external grant were the property of WU.7 1 The WVU
informed consent forms, emblazoned with the WU logo, never
indicated that Dr. Catalona would either own or have exclusive
control over the tissue samples.7 Nowhere did such forms indicate
that research participants retained a right to transfer samples held in
the WU biorepository to a third party.7 In light of these facts, the
court found that the research participants, at the time they consented,
possessed the requisite donative intent to make a gift of their tissue,
the delivery of which WU subsequently accepted. Upon acceptance of
the tissue, under Missouri law, WU' s "ownership [took] effect
immediately and absolutely.",74 As persuasive precedent, the court
cited both Greenberg and Moore.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 987-8 8, 1002-03.
67 Id. at 998.
68 Id. at 999-1000.
69 Id. at 1002.
70 Id. at 994.
7' Id. at 989.
72 Id. at 997.
73 Id. at 990.
71 Id. at 997.
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The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the right to
withdraw from research "includeid] the right to continue control over
the use and location of their excised biological materials." 75 Instead,
the court very narrowly read the right to discontinue participation
simply to mean that the research participant has chosen not to make
any more inter vivos gifts of his or her tissue to the research
institution in question.7 At their prerogative, research institutions
could choose to destroy, store indefinitely, or anonymize (i.e., remove
any identifying biological markers) any extant tissue should a
research participant request discontinuation.
Lastly, the court, echoing the sentiments of an amicus brief filed
by the Association of American Medical Colleges, strenuously
objected to the defendants' claims on public policy grounds.7
Allowing control of tissue samples to remain in the hands of
individual research participants would lead to the "thwart[ing]" of
biomedical progress by "private agendas" and "prejudicial
influences."78 As in Moore and Greenberg, the district court in
Catalona found that allowing research participants to retain even the
slightest proprietary interests in their excised tissue would "seriously
threaten[]" the "integrity and utility of all birpsiois
D. Catalona (Appellate Court)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, while affirming
the district court's ruling, narrowly focused its holding to the
exclusion of any policy considerations whatsoever. The appellate
court specifically affirmed, "[u]nder the facts of this case," the district
court's finding that the research participants made an inter vivos gift
to WVU. 80 The appellate court's holding is notable for what it does not
say. Given the absence of policy analysis, nothing in the appellate
court's ruling would prevent future interested parties from reaching
an entirely different outcome via contract. The court's narrow holding
seemingly leaves tremendous room for future researchers and
research participants to contract around any obstacles to retaining
15 Id. at 999.
7Id. at 1000.
77 Id. at 1002; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Medical Colleges
Regarding the Legal Status and Use of Donated Biological Materials, Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d
985 (No. 4:O3CV1O65SNL).
78 Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
79 Id.
80 Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
1122 (2008) (emphasis added).
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control over excised tissue samples-thus adding a new wrinkle to
the debate.
To summarize, the courts side strongly with research institutions
retaining exclusive ownership rights over excised tissue samples.
Largely on policy grounds, the majority of courts understand the goal
of ensuring biomedical progress as requiring the denial of research
participants retaining any ongoing proprietary interests in their
excised tissue samples. Correspondingly, these courts often discount
the need to protect research participants' right to informed consent
through affording such interests. And while the Catalona appellate
court leaves open alternative contractual possibilities, the court's
narrow decision by no means undermines the policy-driven common
law status quo.
RI. POLICY GoALs: STRIKING THE BEST BALANCE
As the majority in Moore discusses, policymnakers must take
account of two potentially conflicting goals when addressing the
ownership of human tissue samples. On the one hand, and in keeping
with the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, the purpose
of ascribing ownership in human tissue is "[tlo promote the Progress
of Science,"8 specifically, the biomedical sciences. On the other, and
given the morally scandalous history of much biomedical research,
any ownership regime must also afford deep respect to a research
participant's right to informed consent/refusal . The key then is to
identify the ownership regime that strikes the proper balance between
these policy goals. The courts, as noted above, tend to give fairly
short shrift to the goal of protecting research participant informed
consent in order to promote biomedical progress. These twin policy
goals, however, are equally important.
A. Promoting Biomedical Progress
As Professor David Korn observes, human tissue samples have
been, and will undoubtedly continue to be, perhaps the crucial raw
material in the war against disease and disability. For instance, the use
of human tissue samples has played an essential role in the study of
the etiology, diagnosis, and treatment of the following disorders:
cervical cancer, liver cancer, lung cancer, atherosclerotic
cardiovascular disease, brain tumors, pnion diseases, multiple
81U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
52 See generally ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH
(198 1) (providing a comprehensive overview of human participation in biomedical research).
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sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, lymphatic cancer, the genetics of colon
cancer, prostate cancer, and Kaposi's sarcoma Further, the use of
human tissue samples has also been crucial to enabling public health
officials to identify extremely dangerous and contagious viral
infections.84 In conclusion, Professor Komn writes that he could
provide hundreds of additional examples. Human tissue samples are a
"rich and irreplaceable source" constituting a "public treasure." 85
Indeed, "I[tlhere is quite literally no comparable research resource to
substitute for it.",86 Therefore, "public policy must continue to
encourage the accumulation of the human tissue archive and
facilitate its accessibility for medical research.8
B. Protecting Informed Consent
At the same time, however, the history of biomedicine is replete
with ethically egregious behavior on the part of researchers towards
research participants. The horrifying excesses perpetrated at places
like Auschwitz and Dachau continue to cast a moral pallor over
contemporary biomedical research. 8 8 In the United States, the
eugenics movement of the early twentieth century served as the
inspiration for the "Nazi biomedical vision.",89 But even the
widespread acceptance of the Nuremberg Code did not prevent
researchers from conducting either the Human Radiation
experiments"0 or the infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiments9 '-both
of which lasted well into the early 1970s. Essentially, and as
discussed at length below, the right to informed consent in research
contexts comprises two basic liberty interests: (1) the freedom to
refuse to participate in research (a first refusal right); and (2) the
freedom to withdraw from any research at any time and for any
reason (a revocability right).9 Only then is the autonomy and dignity
of research participants given its proper due.
83 David Kom, Contribution of the Human Tissue Archive to the Advancement of Medical
Knowledge and the Public Health, in II RESEARCH INVOLVING BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS:
ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE E-1, E-4 to -21 (National Bioethics Advisory
Commission 2000).
84 Id. at E-22.
85 Id. at E-23.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 ROBERT JAY LiFrON, THE NAZI DOCTORS 161-212 (1986).
89 Id. at 22.
90 AURORA PLOMER, THE L-AW AND ETHICS OF MEDICAL RESEARCH: INTERNATIONAL
BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29-32 (2005).
91 See generally JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT
(new & expanded ed. 1993).
92 See, e.g., World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for
20091 183
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Putting the two together, satisfying the first policy goal requires
creating as much unfettered researcher access to tissue samples as
possible. Satisfying the second policy goal demands protecting the
rights of research participants to refrain from, and to revoke, a
transfer of their excised tissues to a biorepository. Further, potential
success at the first policy goal trades heavily on achieving the second.
As Professor Kom observes, researcher access means little without
continued tissue archive growth .9  Research participant consent is
thus essential to the growth of the human tissue archive. Yet several
recent studies show that many Americans are extremely suspicious
about what will become of their transferred tissues. 94 To weaken the
informed consent doctrine, particularly at the point of revocability as
the district courts in Greenberg and Catalona have done, might well
prove extremely counterproductive to bolstering biomedical progress.
Which human tissue ownership regime best maximizes researcher
access while preserving a research participant's right to informed
consent? Four candidates present themselves: (1) research
institutions; (2) researchers; (3) research participants; and (4) a public
trust. To strike the best balance between these policy goals, the first
three possibilities prove less than desirable.
C Research Institutions
Why not follow the courts and vest research institutions with full
ownership rights in their stored tissue samples? Following Greenberg
and Catalona, an inter vivos gift is the courts' favored legal vehicle to
account for the transfer of tissue from research participants to
research institutions. As a result, these institutions retain exclusive
ownership in their tissue samples. The courts then marshal policy
arguments to support a gift analysis as the best means to ensure
biomedical progress. Undoubtedly, a major motivating factor here is
the desire on the part of research institutions to retain lucrative patent
rights to commercially viable biomedical innovations that rely on
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects B(24) (1964, last amended 2008), available at
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/pdf/17c.pdf ("The potential subject must be informed of the right
to refuse to participate in the study or to withdraw consent to participate at any time without
reprisal.").
93 Kom, supra note 83, at E-23.
94 See WEIR & OLICK, supra note 14, at 26-31 (discussing several recent studies that
focused on potential research participants' attitudes toward tissue donation).
95 Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 997-98 (E.D. Mo. 2006), affd, 490 F.3d
667 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008); Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hasp.
Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074-76 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
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human tissue as a crucial raw material. 96 Nonetheless, the Intellectual
Property Clause is not concerned with ownership per se but rather
with identifying that ownership regime that best enhances "the
Progress of Science."97 The clause "embodies a carefully crafted
bargain" designed to provide an incentive to create new technologies
and forgoes reifying ownership as an end itself.98
Providing researchers with the broadest possible access to human
tissue samples is the best way to maximize the likelihood of
biomedical progress.99 Vesting exclusive ownership in individual
research institutions potentially undermines such access. Currently,
offsite researchers can access the tissue held in another research
institution's biorepository through the use of Material Transfer
Agreements ("MTAs"). The typical MTA requires, among other
things, that the requesting researchers provide proof of Institutional
Review Board ("IRB") approval, compensate the biorepository for the
materials desired, and forswear any warranties of the material
provided to avoid liability under the Uniform Commercial Code.'00
More to the point, the typical MTA describes offsite researcher access
to the material as "a service to the research conmmunity," which the
research institution exercises at its prerogative. 01
Traditionally, research institutions routinely honor MTAS from
offsite researchers if the requested material is available, but legally,
research institutions need not do so. Imagine if Dr. Catalona had
successfully transferred thousands of prostate tissue samples from
WU to Northwestern. Nothing would stop WU from refusing to
provide any samples in the future to researchers at Northwestern. One
could easily imagine a tissue "war" breaking out that would require
research institutions to form "tissue pacts." To ensure maximal
researcher access to tissue samples, however, the safest ownership
regime would seemingly a priori preclude individual research
institutions from engaging in such deleterious tit-for-tat behavior.
Further, the gift analysis granting exclusive ownership to research
institutions fits badly with informned consent revocability rights.
96 Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 1000, 1002.
97 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
91 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989) (striking
down a Florida statute that extended the patentability of boat hull design beyond that sanctioned
by Federal patent policy).
99 Kom, supra note 83, at E-23.
:0 See Massachusetts General Hospital Tissue Repository Transfer Agreement, available
at http://www2.massgeneral.org/cancer/pdfs/research/cinicalttials-transfer..agreement.pdf (last
visited May 5, 2009).
'(01 See National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research, Material Transfer
Agreement 2, available at http://www.nidcr.nih.gov/NR/rdonlyres/l1200FA2E-09B0-4294-
9803-B 135F673302A/7402/MT~formVI6.doc (last visited May 5, 2009) (emphasis added).
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Classically, inter vivos gifts are unconditional and, hence,
irrevocable.102 While the common law of some states, such as
Missouri, allows for "imperfect gifts," the common law of other states
does not.'103 Such an odd legal creature inadequately accounts for the
right of research participants to withdraw their tissue from research,
i.e., to revoke their consent. The result, as the Catalona district court
decision exemplifies, is a substantively gutted revocability right. 10
Such a right typically amounts to nothing more than the right to
refuse to give future tissue samples, i.e., a prospective right to first
refusal. Thus, vesting exclusive ownership in individual research
institutions proves wanting in both policy arenas.
D. Researchers
What about vesting researchers with exclusive ownership rights?
Researchers could acquire tissue from individual research participants
through either gift or purchase. Potentially severe policy problems,
however, plague this regime from the outset. First, the tit-for-tat
scenario discussed above becomes even more extreme when the tissue
owner is an individual researcher as opposed to an individual research
institution. The numbers of "tissue owners" would increase
exponentially overnight. Such a regime would create a disincentive
for individual research institutions to create biorepositories, since
researchers could easily remove the contents thereof and take it with
them to a new institution. Vesting exclusive ownership in individual
researchers would reduce research institutions to little more than
bailees, hard-pressed to maintain the integrity of their bailor's tissue
collection. Widespread access to tissue samples could occur only at
the prerogative of individual researchers-clearly an unlikely recipe
for achieving the first policy goal.
Moreover, research participants' rights to informed consent would
also suffer. As noted, revocability of an inter vivos gift is very tricky
to engineer-it is almost impossible to do so subsequent to the
rendering of valuable consideration in exchange for tissue samples. 05
Lastly, the very fact that researchers themselves are not calling for
102RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIvE TRANSFERS §§ 6.1-6.2
(2003).
103 Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 675 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
1122 (2008).
104Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1000 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff d, 490 F.3d
667 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008).
105 Only patients such as John Moore with inherently valuable tissue-the case, as it were,
of a biological windfall-would benefit from such a system. The vast majority of research
participants would not.
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such a regime speaks volumes. Presumably, few researchers wish to
saddle themselves with the heavy transaction and administrative costs
that such a regime would impose.
E. Research Participants
What about vesting research participants with excusive ownership
rights? Taking their cue from Justice Mosk's dissent in Moore, this
proposal receives substantial support from a host of legal academics.
Professor Donna Gitter provides the most detailed analysis. 106 For
Professor Gitter, individuals such as Ted Slavin and groups such as
PXE International provide the paradigm cases. 107 In the 1960s and
1 970s, Ted Slavin routinely sold his antibody-rich blood to
researchers who went on to develop the HBV vaccine for Hepatitis
B.108 More recently, a group of patients suffering from the rare
genetic disorder pseudoxanthomna elasticum ("PXE") banded together
to form PXE International.'10 Afflicted members of the group
provided tissues to researchers and PXE International subsequently
negotiated a share in the patent rights and licensing royalties for the
resulting diagnostic test.110 On this model, patients are free to
negotiate and contract with the highest bidder for their tissue. The
exchange could also involve a nonmonetary quid pro quo, e.g., tissue
samples in exchange for freely available diagnostic tests.
Importantly, Professor Gitter's proposal vests research participants
with the complete "bundle of sticks" in their tissue. Such an approach,
she argues, provides research participants with maximal control over
their tissues both before and after excision. In a Kantian vein,
Professor Gitter touts her proposal as the best way to prevent
researchers and research institutions from reducing research
participants to a mere means to an end."1' She calls on Congress,
acting under its Commerce Clause authority, to create a legislative
scheme whereby unfairly treated research participants have a host of
106See Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition
of Human Research Participants' Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 257 (2004). For an author who shares Professor Gitter's views in the context of
Catalona, see Lori Andrews, Who Owns Your Body? A Patient's Perspective on Washington
University v. Catalona, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHicS 398 (2006). For a more moderate proposal, see
WEIR & OLICK, supra note 14, at 306-24.
107Gitter, supra note 106, 316-22. Professor Gitter does not discuss the case of Mr. Slavin
per se, but he clearly falls under her desired tissue ownership paradigm.
10 8 Rebecca Skloot, Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, (Magazine), at 38;
see also B. S. Blumberg, I. Millman, & W. T. London, Ted Slavin 's Blood and the
Development of HBV Vaccine, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 189 (1985).
109 Gitter, supra note 106, at 316-19.
"Old.
I IId. at 301 n. 174.
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remedies at their disposal, including both conversion and unjust
enrichment.'"2 Professor Gitter further argues that, far from stifling
biomedical progress, her system will simply provide tremendous
incentives for researchers and research institutions to treat research
participants with the utmost respect." 3
Such proposals appear strongest when the factual backdrop
involves either instances of biological uniqueness such as John Moore
and Ted Slavin or orphan diseases such as Canavan's disease and
PXE. If generalized across the board to every instance of tissue
transfer, however, Professor Gitter's approach poses a threat to
biomedical progress. First, every act of tissue transfer could easily
become a protracted legal negotiation. Professor Gitter never
thoroughly considers the impact that such potentially devastating
transaction costs would have on biomedical research. Indeed, if
researchers paid research participants for every tissue sample,
financial costs, along with time and opportunity costs, might well
become prohibitive.
Second, allowing patients a full set of property rights in their
excised tissue would seemingly turn tissue transfers into a simple
bailment. As bailors, research participants would presumably retain
the right to remove and transfer their tissues willy-nilly-as the
district court in Catalona feared.' 14 Again, research institutions would
face a major disincentive to undertake the construction and
maintenance of biorepositories! "5  Third, allowing research
participants to set highly specific research agendas with regard to
their tissue samples would require researchers to seek revised or
renewed consent on a frequent basis.'"6 Again, the threat of fatal
transaction costs looms large.
In sum, Moore, Greenberg, and Catalona generate fears amongst
potential research participants that any viable system of human tissue
ownership must address. Allowing research participants to retain a
full range of ongoing proprietary interests in their excised tissue,
however, goes beyond what is necessary to protect rights to first
refusal and revocability. In doing so, such proposals threaten to
112 Id. at 338-40.
113 d. at 340-4 1.
114 Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2006), affd, 490 F.3d
667 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008).
''1 d.
116 See William Grizzle et al., Recommended Policies for Uses of Human Tissue in
Research, Education, and Quality Control, 123 ARCHIVES OF PATHOLOGY AND LABORATORY
MED. 296, 299 (1999) (describing the requirement for specific informed consent from donors of
tissue to be used for research purposes, and the difficulty inherent in anticipating and obtaining
such consent for all possible future research uses of that patient's tissue).
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endanger biomedical progress by burdening the research process with
enormous and unending transaction costs.
H1I. CREATING A PUBLIC TISSUE TRUST
A properly instituted public tissue trust avoids the most serious
problems that infect the current and proposed ownership regimes. As
shown below, such a trust strikes the best balance between promoting
biomedical progress and protecting the right to informed consent. In
what follows, this Note addresses the nature and underlying
presuppositions of a public tissue trust, the mechanics of such a
trust's creation and maintenance, its scope, and the compatibility of a
public tissue trust with the Bayh-Dole Act.
A. Nature and Underlying Presuppositions
The following elements constitute any trust: (1) the settlor; (2) the
transfer; (3) the property, corpus, or res; (4) the trustee; (5) the
purpose; and (6) the beneficiary.' 17 To create a trust, the settlor must
voluntarily provide, i.e., "dedicate," the trust's property or res by
transferring the legal title thereof to a trustee. In turn, the trust
agreement binds the trustee to exercise ownership for the well-being
of a third party, the beneficiary."18 The creation of a fiduciary
relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary constitutes the
normative essence of any trust. A revocable trust exists if the settlor
retains the power to termninate the trust.'1 The trust may, however, set
limits on the settlors' power to revoke. 20 If the settlor retains no
powers of revocability then the trust is irrevocable, not unlike a
completed inter vivos gift.'12' While settlors may create trusts for a
variety of purposes, the law of trusts views those created to benefit
the public at large as charitable in nature.12 2
Here, the research participant, i.e., the original "owner" of the
tissue in question, would be the settlor. 123 Presumably, research
participants (or their proxies) would have to satisfy the competency
requirements that the doctrine of informed consent for medical
research imposes. At the culmination of the informed consent process,
11
7 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 2-3,28 (2003).
119 Id. § 3 cmt. d.
1191d. § 63 cmt. c (describing the presumption of revocability where the settlor has retained
an interest in the trust).
120 See id. § 63 (stating the power of the settlor to modify the trust to the extent provided by
the trust's terms).
121 Id. § 63 cmt. c(l).
122 See id. § 28 (describing the various permissible purposes for a charitable trust).
23 Gottlieb, supra note 3, at 192.
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settlorsf research participants would dedicate their proprietary interests
in their tissue to the trust. To protect their informed consent,
settlors/research participants would retain the power to revoke the
trust by having their tissue removed from ongoing research and/or
destroyed.
Crucially, however, the research participants would only retain a
limited right of revocability, i.e., they could demand the withdrawal
and destruction of their tissue but not its return for purposes of
transfer. In theory, a trust may limit a settlor' s power to revoke in a
number of ways.'24 For example, many charitable trusts created to
benefit religious organizations permnit a settlor to revoke his or her
monetary dedication only upon a showing of an adverse change
in financial circumstances.125 Here, a settlor' s power to revoke by
having his or her tissue withdrawn from ongoing research and
destroyed would not extend to a right to withdrawal and transfer. As
the district court in Catalona reasoned (and as discussed below),
affording research participants such broad revocability rights goes
beyond what is necessary to protect the right to informed consent and
threatens to undermine the institutional integrity of biorepositories.12 6
The trust agreement would further have to institute procedures
governing the revocability process, e.g., requiring that settlors revoke
in writing.127 The property or res would be the excised tissue itself.12 1
The trustee, as both title holder to the tissue and the ultimate bearer
of fiduciary responsibility, would be the federal government. The
trust would impose three basic fiduciary responsibilities: (1) the duty
to maintain and secure the tissue samples; (2) the duty to ensure and
safeguard the informed consent process; and (3) the duty to ensure
access to the trust by individuals engaged in bona fide scientific
research. In turn, the federal government would charge research
institutions with the local administration of the trust. IRBs would thus
play a crucial role in executing the second and third fiduciary duties.
IRBs evaluate research not only in terms of its ethical impact on
research participants but also on the proposed merits of the research
1
2
1 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 (2003) (discussing the power of a settlor to
revoke or modify a trust).
125 See Timothy L. Homer & Hugh H. Makens, Securities Regulation of Fundraising
Activities of Religious and Other Nonprofit Organizations, 27 STETSON L. REV. 473, 484-85
(1997) (discussing the "limited revocability exception" for charitable trusts).
126 Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff'd, 490 F.3d
667 (8th (2ir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008).
127 See 4 AUSTINJ WAKEMAN Scorr & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 330 (4th ed. 1989).
128 Gottlieb, supra note 3, at 192. What may count as trust property is only limited by the
very concept of property itself: "Any Property May Be Trust Property." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 40 (2003).
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itself. 129 The latter point is to avoid the needless waste of valuable
scientific resources such as excised tissue samples. While title would
vest in the federal government, no threat to commercialization need
occur. As this Note addresses extensively below, a public tissue trust
is fully compatible with the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980."30
This raises an immediate worry: biorepositories are clearly
expensive to construct and maintain-otherwise WU would never
have initiated legal proceedings against Dr. Catalona. As noted, a
trust would require research institutions to function as the local
administrators of their own biorepositories. Further, and as
anecdotally evidenced by their uniformly relentless fund-raising
efforts and tuition increases, major research institutions are
perpetually short of cash. The creation of a public tissue trust would
thus necessarily involve a significant increase in federal funding for
the maintenance and expansion of the tissue collection contained
therein. At the very least, the federal government would have to
provide matching funds to research institutions willing to take on the
responsibility of a biorepository. Research institutions maintaining
biorepositories would thus benefit financially from tissue trust
creation. In addition, the independent incentives to establish and
maintain biorepositories would remain. Presumably, research
institutions currently create biorepostiories to enhance their prestige
and to attract top-flight researchers. Why would research institutions
behave any differently under a trust regime? Prestige concerns would
remain unchanged, and, not unlike a large library collection, ready
access to a well-stocked biorepository would still provide highly
sought-after researchers with an incentive to join the faculty.131
Charitable purposes, directed at both "the promotion of health"
and "the advancement of knowledge or education," would constitute
the tissue trust's raison d'etre. 13 2 Such charitable purposes would fit
well with the nonprofit nature of major research institutions (e.g.,
universities), government health agencies (e.g., the National Institutes
129 SeTom L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 320 (5th ed. 2001) (discussing the IRB's role in reviewing the conditions
that must be met in order for scientists to engage in research with human
subjects). The authors further note that lRBs must ensure there exists "a reasonable prospect
that the research will generate the knowledge that is sought." Id.
1-35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2006). Many scholars assume that such a trust would prohibit
commercialization and thus reject the idea out of hand. See, e.g., Gitter, supra note 106, at 343-
4' 3 Policymakers could further buttress this incentive by including a "first dibs" provision
in the necessary legislation. That is, a local researcher's request for a tissue sample would trump
that of a foreign researcher's request for the same sample if not enough of the desired sample
existed to provide the requested amount to each.
132 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRusTS § 28 (2003).
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of Health), and graduate medical education programs (e.g., Harvard
Medical School). Lastly, the trust would have two classes of
beneficiaries: (1) the public at large (i.e., all those persons who
currently, and in the future, would benefit from basic research
involving excised human tissue); and (2) research scientists who seek
to advance the cause of knowledge per se. Putting all of the above
together, we arrive at a public revocable charitable tissue trust.
A serious wrinkle, however, remains. The requirement that
settlor-research participants "own"' their tissue prior to transfer,
and subsequently retain revocability rights therein apparently flies
in the face of Moore and its progeny. 133 Trusts necessarily presuppose
the transfer of property from settlor to trustee. Contrary to Moore, can
research participants "own" their tissue? Yes. Clearly, Congress could
simply supersede the courts here and pass legislation declaring human
tissue to be property. A more nuanced argument proves essential,
however, if only to convince the members of Congress to pass
superseding legislation.
A famous passage in Locke's Second Treatise of Civil Government
goes to the intuitive heart of the matter: "Though the earth and all
inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a
"property" in his own "person." This nobody has any right to but
himself. 134 Locke's "self-ownership" thesis, as it were, remains
deeply woven into the Western psyche, so much so that we might
profitably refer to it as the "Lockean Intuition." 13 5 The almost
universal embrace of the Lockean Intuition provides the most
important intellectual backdrop to any ensuing discussion concerning
excised tissue ownership. Indeed, the majority in Moore's apparent
rejection of this intuition led to widespread revulsion and anger
amongst both legal academics and informed laypersons. 136
Clearly, excised tissue, unlike the human beings whence it comes,
is subject to ownership claims. Major research institutions, such as
the University of California, certainly view themselves as the owners
of the tissue samples stored in their biorepositories. Imagine if
researchers from Stanford, in a fit of jealous pique, destroyed the
University of California biodepository. Presumably, the University of
California would mount a conversion action against the researchers.
133 Gottlieb, supra note 3, at 192.
134JOHN LOCKE, THiE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 20 (Prometheus Books
1986) (1690) (emphasis added).
135 See MICHAEL P. ZUCKERI, NAT URAL RIGHTS AN'D THE NEW REPUBLICANISM 220-21
(1994).
136 The author of this Note was unable to find a single law review article supporting the
majority decision in Moore.
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Would the court really refuse to recognize the validity of such a
claim? Presumably not-and, as such, the court would have to
acknowledge the deprivation of the University of California's
ownership interests in its tissue collection and hold the researchers
liable accordingly. Further, in the actual world, the typical MTA
informs the recipient researcher that the provider institution "owns"
the sample: "The PROVIDER retains ownership of the MATERIAL,
including any MATERIAL contained or incorporated in
MODIFICATIONS."13 7 Indeed, the right of provider institutions to
deny such requests follows directly from their exclusive ownership
rights to the tissue samples in their possession. Hence, the law
recognizes and vests exclusive ownership of excised tissues samples
in research institutions but refuses to do so in the case of research
participants.
From a purely metaphysical point of view, the distinction between
research institutions and research participants is one without a
difference. Logically, the Moore court's apparent ex nihilo vesting of
exclusive ownership rights in the former, but not the latter, makes
little sense. The Moore majority thus makes much of California's
public health laws, which prohibit unlicensed individuals from
possessing bio-hazardous materials such as excised tissue samples. 138
Nonetheless, as Justice Broussard hammers home, such laws speak to
public safety and not ownership. 139 At most, public health laws limit
the personal possession, but need not limit the ownership, of human
biomaterials.
Under a bailment theory, personal ownership exists in such tissues
as blood (e.g., in blood banks), sperm (e.g., in sperm banks), and
embryos (e.g., in fertility clinics).14 0 Here, the individual bailor, e.g., a
couple with fertility problems, deposits their biological tissue, e.g.,
fertilized preembryos, with a bailee, e.g., a fertility clinic, for safe
keeping until the need for the tissue arises. Clearly, the bailor, and not
137 Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 12,771, 12,773 (Mar. 8,
1995) (emphasis added).
138 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 491-92 (Cal. 1990). Justice
Panelli, writing for the majority, also claims that the Regents' patent in Moore's cell line
precludes Moore from making any ownership claims to the fruits thereof. Id. at 493. This
argument, however, goes directly to the more narrow issue of conversion, as opposed to the
possibility of ownership per se. This Note addresses this argument in Part V.
139 ld. at 503 (noting that nothing in the statute suggests patients should be unable to
choose among "legally permissible uses" for the excised tissue such as use for research or
commercial purposes).
'4OSee Gottlieb, supra note 3, at 188-90 (describing bailment theory generally and its
application to biological samples). For the case of frozen pre-embryos, see York v. Jones, 717 F.
Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). In the case of pre-embryos frozen for in vitro fertilization ("IVF')
purposes, some courts view such tissue as "quasi-property" insofar as it bears the potential for
life. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
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the bailee, owns the tissue in question even though possession
remains at all times with the latter.14 1 The clearest mark of such
ownership is a bailor' s retention of the right to remove and transfer
his or her tissue to another bailee --even though public health laws
may preclude the personal possession of such tissues, e.g., storing
preembryos in a home freezer.14
A gift analysis produces similar results. The Restatement (Third)
of Property defines a gift as a voluntary "transfer [of] an ownership
interest to the donee without consideration and with donative
intent."14 3 Hence, even the district court's reasoning in Catalona
presupposes that research participants, prior to donation, retain an
ownership interest, i.e., property, in their tissue. If not, then the
proffered gift analysis makes no sense. Prior to donating their tissue
to the WVU biorepository, the research participants in Catalona of
necessity retained exclusive ownership interests therein. Otherwise,
no gift would have been possible. Short of a highly implausible
abandonment theory (given the detailed consent forms describing the
transfer as a "free and generous gift"'"4), WU's claim to exclusive
ownership in its tissue archive would otherwise crumble.
The use of bodily tissues as evidence in criminal trials provides a
useful analogy. In Rochin v. California,145 a convicted drug trafficker
argued that the Court should overturn his conviction because the
police had a physician forcibly pump his stomach in order to acquire
evidence for trial.'46 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority,
found that such behavior on the part of the police "shockied] the
conscience" and amounted to an egregious violation of the
petitioner's due process rights.14 7 Specifically, "[i]llegally breaking
into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and
remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's
contents . . . . are methods too close to the rack and the screw to
permit of constitutional differentiation."'14 8 Only if the petitioner had
consented to the stomach pumping could the extracted remnants of
141 See York, 717 F. Supp. at 425 (describing the existence of a bailment relationship
between potential parents and the medical college at which they stored their cryopreserved
zygote).
142 See id. at 425-26 (finding a breach of the bailment contract where defendants refused to
consent to a transfer of the biological material).
143 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 (2003)
(emphasis added).
144 Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Stipp. 2d 985, 990 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff d, 490 F.3d
667 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008).
145342 U.S. 165 (195 1).
146See id. at 166.
147 Id. at 172.
148Id.
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the morphine pills that he had swallowed been admitted into evidence
against him. 49 In their concurrences, Justices Black and Douglas
argued that the Fifth Amendment guarantee against compelled
self-incrimination provided a better constitutional foundation than
the majority's due process approach. 150 Either way, the lack of
consent on the part of the petitioner loomed large.
While the Rochin Court did not address the issue of tissue
ownership per se, presumably both the majority and concurring
opinions presupposed that the contents of the petitioner's stomach
belonged to him, and not to the State. Otherwise, the lack of consent
would not have been constitutionally problematic. In line with the
Lockean Intuition, Ruchin stands for the proposition that our persons
(and their contents) are our property, and, other things being equal,
the State may only take or intrude upon our property with our
consent.
More directly, Professor Karen Gottlieb points to Venner v.
State.151 In Venner, the Maryland court found that the defendant drug
smuggler had abandoned hashish-filled balloons upon their excretion
from his gastrointestinal system. Voluntary relinquishment of
ownership constitutes abandonment, and, as first finders, the police
could claim title to the balloons.15 2 The court thus denied the
defendant's claim that police performed an illegal search on his feces
(and the balloons therein) because they did not have a warrant to do
so. Nonetheless, as Professor Gottlieb observes, the court, in dicta,
did view the defendant's feces as his property:
It could not be said that a person has no property right in
wastes or other materials which were once a part of or
contained within his body, but which normally are discarded
after their separation from the body. It is not unknown for a
person to assert a continuing right of ownership, dominion, or
control, for good reason or for no reason, over such things as
excrement, fluid waste, secretions, hair, fingernails, toenails,
blood, and organs or other parts of the body, whether their
separation from the body is intentional, accidental, or merely
the result of normal body functions. 153
1491d. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring).
151d. atl75 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 178-79 (Douiglas, J., concurring).
151 354 A.2d 483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976), aff'd, 367 A.2d 949 (Md. 1977).
152 Id. at 498-99.
153 Id. at 498 (footnote omitted).
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Although it occurs within the context of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Venner decision is important to the present
discussion. It neatly illustrates the power and scope of the Lockean
Intuition with regard to the personal ownership of human tissue.
Clearly, the conclusion that research participants own their tissue
prior to its removal from their bodies appears inescapable. What
about post-removal? Here, policy considerations come to the fore.
Any acceptable theory of post-removal ownership of human tissue for
research purposes must strike the best balance between the policy
goals of promoting biomedical progress and protecting informed
consent. That is, we may temper the Lockean Intuition to serve other
pressing policy goals.
Other constitutional arenas, particularly Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, again provide some illustrative examples. As noted,
Rochin and Venner stand for the proposition that, other things being
equal, the criminal justice system must afford the Lockean Intuition
great respect. Nonetheless, all things considered, the interests of
justice may, on occasion, trump the Lockean Intuition.
For instance, in Schmerber v. California, 154 the petitioner,
convicted for drunk driving, argued that a blood alcohol test drawn
without his consent violated, among other things, his right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 155 The Supreme Court, in
rejecting the petitioner's claim, reasoned that the "Fourth
Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all [bodily]
intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the
circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner." 156
Specifically, the Court found that the police officer involved could
''reasonably have believed'' that without the test vital evidence would
have been lost, that the test itself was minimally invasive, that the
petitioner did not object on religious grounds, and lastly, that the
physician properly performed the test. 157 As such, the State's need to
secure vital evidence for trial outweighed the petitioner's interest in
being free from a non-consensual, minimally invasive bodily
intrusion. 158
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 15 9 the respondent was
caught attempting to smuggle narcotics into the United States via
1- 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
155 tId. at 759.
156 Id. at 768.
157 Id. at 770-7 1.
158 Id. at 772.
59473 U.S. 531 (1985).
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balloons in her alimentary canal .160 Acting under police direction, a
physician conducted a rectal exam and discovered a narcotics-filled
balloon. The police subsequently detained the respondent for several
days until she passed all of the balloons. 161 Prior to the exam, the
respondent refused the option of leaving the country on the next
available flight to Colombia.162 The respondent claimed that the rectal
search and subsequent detention constituted an unreasonable search
and seizure of her person and its contents. The Supreme Court
rejected the respondent's claim and reasoned that "[t]he permissibility
of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by 'balancing its
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests."' 16 3 Here, the need to
gather evidence for trial and to prevent large quantities of narcotics
from entering the United States outweighed the respondent's right to
avoid the search of her alimentary canal and detention of her person
(particularly since the respondent had the option of leaving prior to
the search).
Similarly, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association,164
the Supreme Court upheld the mandatory blood, urine, and
breathalyzer testing of railroad employees involved in accidents and
other major safety violations. Following Schmerber, the Court
reasoned that such tests did not constitute an undue infringement on
the "justifiable expectations of privacy of covered employees." 165 The
need for public safety tempered a railroad employee's right to be free
from such intrusions.166
Importantly, none of the above decisions represent a retreat
from Rochin: government behavior that "shocks the conscience"
remains strictly prohibited. Rather, in these decisions, the Court
permits certain nonconsensual bodily invasions (justified by the
circumstances and properly administered) to serve other legitimate,
narrowly circumscribed governmental interests (e.g., the prevention
of narcotics smuggling). In a similar vein, the need to promote
biomedical progress may temper the breadth of the Lockean Intuition
concerning the ownership of human biomnaterials upon their excision
160Id. at 532-33.
161 Id. at 5 35-36.
162Id. at 5 34.
1631Id. at 537 (quoting United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983)).
1-489 U.S. 602 (1989).
165 Id. at 628; see also Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(holding that the Custnms Service could require employees eligible fnr prnmntion tn undergo a
drug test because it was necessary to prevent drug users from occupying sensitive official
positions).
166 kinner, 489 U.S. at 615.
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and removal from the research participant's body. The key is to
identify an ownership regime that protects the research participant's
right to informed consent without undermining biomedical progress.
Three excised tissue ownership regimes constitute viable
candidates: (1) gift; (2) bailment; and (3) trust. 167  As noted
extensively above, an inter vivos gift regime seemingly provides
research institutions with free rein over their tissue samples. By
definition, such gifts are irrevocable.16 8 In light of worries over
research institutions refusing to share these precious donations with
their peers, why not simply extend an inter vivos gift analysis to a
national biorepository? Such an institution would presumably work
wonders in guaranteeing researchers unfettered access to human
tissue samples. Nonetheless, applied to any level-individual
researcher, research institution, or a public repository-such a theory
of property transfer precludes the research participant from retaining
any revocability rights, thereby undermining informed consent.
Bailment operates at the other end of the spectrum. Presumably, by
enabling research participants to retain full ownership rights over
their excised samples, the protection of informed consent reaches its
zenith and the Lockean Intuition reigns supreme. As Professor
Gottlieb observes, however, the theory of bailment and human tissues
excised for research purposes make an uneasy fit.' 69 First, in the vast
majority of tissue sample transfers, "the originator of the biological
sample does not . . . keep legal title to the samples." 70 Further,
research participants cannot reasonably expect researchers and
research institutions to return their samples to them for the simple but
conclusive fact that such research normally requires the permanent
alteration and routine destruction thereof.171
Policy reasons provide the last nail in the coffin. A bailment
regime would clearly vest research participants with a host of
exclusive ownership rights going beyond what is necessary to protect
their informed consent while simultaneously threatening to undermine
biomedical progress. As noted in the previous section, a bailment
16hrvoal transfer in exchange for valuable consideration is also a possibility, and
nothing in this Note precludes potential research participants from pursuing such options, much
like Ted Slavin, outside of a tissue trust network.
1685 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 (2003).
161Gottlieb, supra note 3, at 190.
170 Id.
171 Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1001 (E.D. Mo. 2006), affid, 490 F.3d
667 (8th (2ir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008). Here, tissue stored for research parts
ways with tissue stored in blood and sperm banks, and fertility clinics-where a bailment
analysis is appropriate.
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theory renders any tissue archive inherently unstable. 172 It permits
research participants to withdraw samples and transfer them to
another research institution or commercial enterprise at their whim.
Post-removal and post-transfer, the Lockean Intuition loses much, but
not all, of its bite.
Ultimately, a trust regime vesting settlors/research participants
with a limited power of revocation offers the best compromise: it
preserves the virtues of both the gift (transfer of title) and bailment
(revocability) regimes while surrendering to none of their respective
vices (irrevocability and extreme archival instability). A limited
revocability trust regime enables research participants to withdraw
their tissue from ongoing research, protecting their informed consent.
Such a regime, however, would not permit the wholesale removal and
transfer/sale of previously dedicated biomnaterials, thus providing for a
high degree of institutional stability for biorepositories. Clearly, a
certain amount of archival instability remains ineliminable. As
previously shown, irrevocability offers the only complete cure for
instability. Irrevocability, however, comes at too steep a price: the
evisceration of informed consent.
A limited revocability public tissue trust both protects informed
consent and provides maximum researcher access. To wit, in
acknowledging that research participants own their tissue prior to its
dedication and subsequently retain limited revocability rights, a trust
regime squares neatly with the Lockean Intuition without
undermining biomedical progress. A public tissue trust further vests
accredited researchers everywhere with a right of access. Future Dr.
Catalonas need not fear for loss of access to a tissue archive simply
because they change jobs. Going back to Justice Broussard's dissent
in Moore, the creation of a public tissue trust leads to a paradigm shift
in the conception of tissue ownership. What was once my tissue or
your tissue becomes our tissue: a treasured and respected public
resource with great potential to alleviate the biomedical suffering that
continues to permeate the human condition.
A residual worry: as discussed extensively below, the creation of a
public tissue trust need not pose any threat to research institutions
acquiring title to biomedical patents under the Bayh-Dole Act of
1980.
1721Id. at 996-97, 1002.
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B. Mechanics and Maintenance
The Commerce Clause clearly grants Congress the requisite
authority to create a public tissue trust. In United States v. Lopez,17
the Court "identified three broad categories of activity that Congress
may regulate under its commerce power": (1) the channels of
interstate comm-erce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce;
and (3) those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce.17 4 Congress need not invoke the third category if the
regulated activity falls within the parameters of either the first or the
second categories.17 5 Presumably, research activity involving excised
human tissue would fall under both the second category involving the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce and the third category as
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.
Human tissue samples fall squarely within the "instrumentalities
of interstate commerce"176 category. Researchers and research
institutions routinely ship such samples throughout the United States.
As the routine use of MTAs shows, the acquisition of such samples
often requires money to change hands. Further, research participants
and/or patients, the sole sources of such samples, routinely cross state
lines prior to the transfer of their tissue to a biorepository.
In United States v. Morsn 7 the Court provided a four-pronged
test to govern congressional enactments falling into the "substantial
relation" category.178 To prove airtight, a statute enacted under
Congress's Commerce Clause authority must: (1) regulate economic
activity; (2) provide a jurisdictional element connecting the act to
interstate commerce; (3) rely on supportive congressional findings;
and (4) evidence a link between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce that is not too attenuated.179
With regard to the first prong, human tissue research clearly
involves economic activity. The construction and maintenance of
biorepositories and scientific laboratories, the purchase of lab
equipment, and the payment of researchers and lab assistants all
involve the exchange of money.
The second prong merely requires that Congress insert a formal
jurisdictional element tying the "Tissue Trust Act" to interstate
commerce. Such an element would expressly limit the reach of the
173 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
174 1Id. at 55 8-59.
1751Id. at 55 8.
76Id
177529 U.S. 598 (2000).
178 See id. at 609-15.
179 d
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"Tissue Trust Act" to those tissue samples sufficiently connected to
interstate commerce. Congress could also readily generate supportive
findings so as to satisfy the third prong.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the link between human
tissue research and interstate commerce is by no means too
attenuated. Via MTAs, excised tissue samples routinely cross state
lines and move in interstate commerce. The entire biomedical
industry, spanning the entire United States, relies on such samples as
one of its essential raw materials. The supplies and materials
necessary to construct both the biorepositories where research
institutions store tissue samples and the labs where researchers study
them move in interstate commerce. Researchers themselves
frequently cross state lines, and out-of-state institutions often directly
fund their research involving human tissue samples.
For these reasons, legislation creating a public tissue trust would
fall squarely under Congress's Commerce Clause authority.
The maintenance of such a trust would require Congress to set
aside adequate funding to preserve and husband the excised human
tissue samples falling within its scope. Funding would also go to
insure adequate administrative oversight of local IRBs both to
enhance researcher access and to protect research participant
informed consent.
Presumably, a "Tissue Trust Act" would mandate periodic
inspections, set up an enforcement arm to investigate violations such
as breaches of informed consent, and affix monetary sanctions (e.g.,
the loss of federal support funds, the suspension of federal grants,
etc.) to violations of the conditions of the trust.
C. Scope
According to a 1999 Rand Report (the most recent available),
various types of institutions, from medical schools to private sperm
banks to military pathology databanks, archived over 300 million
human tissue samples in the United States.' 80 In 1999, this collection
was expanding at a rate of approximately 20 million samples per
annum.18 1 Importantly, the public tissue trust advocated here would
not comprise all available tissue samples in the United States. Instead,
enabling congressional legislation would limit the scope of the trust to
tissue collections controlled by the National Institutes of Health
("NI[H"), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"),
Graduate Medical Education Teaching Institutions ("GMEs"), and
80 EISEMAN & HAGA, supra note 1, at 133.
181 Id.
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specialty collections maintained by major biomedical research
institutions. Examples would respectively include the National
Institute of Mental Health's Brain Bank (controlled by the NIH), the
tissue bank at the National Center for Infectious Disease (controlled
by the CDC), pathology specimens at the Ohio State University
Medical School, and the tissue samples at the Case Western Reserve
University Alzheimer' s Center. So constituted, such a trust would
initially comprise approximately 170-180 million tissue specimens
(in 1999 figures).182 The primary rationale for restricting the scope of
a public tissue trust to the above types of institutions is that the
federal government either directly controls them, e.g., the NIH, or the
institutions in question are large biomedical research institutions that
receive tremendous amounts of federal funding, e.g., Case Western
Reserve University.
Notably, a public tissue trust would exclude several large
collections. For example, the tr-ust would not include the tens of
millions of specimens controlled by the Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology or the million plus forensic specimens under the control of
criminal justice agencies.183 Neither research nor therapeutic purposes
provided the impetus for the creation of such collections, and thus
worries of informed consent come to the foreground. 814 A public
tissue trust would also exclude tissue samples held by fertility clinics
and sperm banks as well as the million plus samples owned by
commercial enterprises such as LifeSpan BioSciences, Inc.18
Following Gibbons v. Ogden 86 and given the deep connection of
human tissue sample research to interstate commerce, Congress could
seemingly nationalize, as it were, the privately held tissue collections
of such for-profit entities. Nonetheless, given the possibly politically
unpalatable consequences of such behavior, Congress should most
likely exercise its "wisdom and .. . discretion" to choose otherwise.18
182 Id. at 137-39 (providing statistics on various institutions and their respective quantities
of tissue samples).
183 See id. at 137, 139.
184Given the terrible history of unethical medical experiments conducted on members of
the armed forces and prisoners, expanding the trust at their expense might well prove counter
productive. Although perhaps upon completing their enlistment, the government could
encourage members of the armed forces to dedicate their tissue to the trust.
185 EISEMAN & HAGA, supra note 1, at 66. LifeSpan BioSciences is a genomics company
that works with genes affecting the aging process as well as genes relating to different diseases.
Id 86 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). As Justice Marshall noted at length concerning Congress's
Commerce Clause power: "[iut is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself,
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the constitution." Id. at 196.
187M. at 197.
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Lastly, a host of private, non-profit, non-educational institutions,
such as the American Type Culture Collection ("ATCC") or the
Hereditary Disease Foundation, control hundreds of thousands of
human tissue samples . Such institutions tend to receive large
amounts of federal funding but are not connected to a federal agency,
a medical school, or a major biomedical research institution.
Presumably, Congress could strongly encourage such institutions to
join the trust but need not require it initially. Many of these entities
have been in existence for decades (e.g., the ATCC dates from 1925),
and it might prove politically problematic to force them into the
fold.189 Further, since these private tissue collections only comprise a
small percentage of extant tissue samples, their non-inclusion would
not undermine the overall practical purpose and value of a public
tissue trust.
D. Compatibility with the Bayh-Dole Act
The proposed tissue trust is fully compatible with both the
spirit and the substance of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.190 Prior to
Bayh-Dole' s enactment, some twenty-six different federal agencies
took title to inventions arising out of federally funded research.19'
Further, federal patent policy only allowed for the granting of
nonexclusive licenses to commercial developers. Absent the
monopoly protection of an exclusive license, commercial developers
had little incentive to bring products to market. As a result, by 1980
"4only 5% of federally-owned patents were being used."19 2 The
avowed congressional purpose behind the Act was thus "to use the
patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from
federally supported research or development."19 3
The Bayh-Dole Act unified federal patent policy with regard to
the patentable fruits of federally-funded research.194 In a nutshell, the
Act permnitted small businesses and nonprofit organizations
(specifically research institutions) to take title to inventions created by
8 8 EiSEMAN & HAGA, supra note 1, at 67.
89 Id. at 68.
1- 35 u.s.c. §§ 200-12 (2006).
191 Wendy H. Schacht, Patent Ownership and Federal Research and Development (R&D):
A Discussion on the Bayh-Dole Act and the Stvenson-Wydier Act, in PATENTS: ISSUES AND
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 61, 64 (John V. Martin ed., 2002) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt.
1, at 3 (1980)).
192Id.
193 35 u.s.c. § 200.
'94 Steven R. Englund & Susan E. Hendrickson, The Bayh-Dole Act and Other
Regulation of Rights to Intellectual Property Developed with Government Involvement, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 1, 9 (Mine C. Flower ed., 2006); see also
Schacht, supra note 191, at 64-65.
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such organizations through contractually awarded federal funding.
Essentially, the Act "establishes a presumption that ownership of all
patent rights in government funded research will vest in any
contractor who is a nonprofit research institution or a small
business."195 Upon acquiring title, research institutions may enter into
exclusive licensing agreements with commercial developers. The
former gains potentially lucrative royalty payments (that the
contracting institution must share with the inventor(s)), while the
latter receives the protection of an exclusive license to engage in
commercial development.
Such exclusivity provides commercial developers with the
necessary economic incentive to engage in extensive product
development, which they lacked prior to Bayh-Dole. The federal
government retains a "nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable,
paid-up license to practice" the invention should a practical
application arise. 196 Lastly, the federal government also holds "march-
in" rights (as of yet never invoked) to seize title if a nonprofit/small
business contractor fails to take reasonable steps towards
commercialization.19 7
By most estimates, Bayh-Dole has been extremely successful and,
on all accounts, amounts to a vast improvement over what existed
prior to its passage. As noted in a celebratory Congressional Report
marking Bayh-Dole' s twenty-fifth anniversary, Congress credits the
Act with leading to the commercial development of numerous
products originating from federally-funded research, most notably the
MRJ machine. 198 The Act has also led to the creation of some 4,000
new American companies. 99 Further, the number of patents awarded
to universities now runs at approximately 3,800 a year compared to
only 250 a year prior to 1980.200
Importantly, the creation of a public tissue trust need not in any
way undermine Bayh-Dole's success. Independently of Bayh-Dole,
federal ownership over the trust's biomnaterials would be no different
than funding awarded for research---except for the fact that the
government would provide raw materials as opposed to money. The
government's role here would be the same: to enable researchers to
19 H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 5 (1980).
19635 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4). Otherwise, the federal government would have to pay twice:
first, the funds to develop the invention, and second the funds to use the invention. For further
discussion, see Englund & Hendrickson, supra note 194, at 2 1-22.
197 35 U.S.C. § 203. For further discussion, see Englund & Hendrickson, supra note 194, at
22-25.
19 H.R. REP. No. 109-409, at 3 (2006).
199 H.R. Con. Res. 319, 109th Cong. (2006).
200Englund & Hendrickson, supra note 194, at 30-3 1.
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conduct scientific investigations into the etiology of disease and
disability.
Further, a trust need not conflict with Bayh-Dole' s fundamental
goal of increased commercialization. Under a trust regime,
universities may still retain title to any patentable discovery that their
researchers make involving tissue obtained from the trust. Two
different scenarios present themselves. The first and unproblematic
case would occur when the researcher acquired the tissue used to
make the discovery from his or her home institution. For example,
a Case Western Reserve scientist makes a patentable discovery
involving brain tissue obtained from Case Western Reserve's
Alzheimer' s Center. Here, as required by Bayh-Dole, Case Western
Reserve would, at its option, retain control of the title.
The second and potentially problematic case would happen when
the researcher acquired the tissue used to make the discovery from a
foreign institution. For example, the same Case Western Reserve
scientist makes a patentable discovery but this time he or she has
acquired the tissue from the Harvard Brain Tissue Resource Center.
What then? With the advent of a trust, the federal government qua
trustee owns all of the biomaterial in question but relies on
institutions such as Harvard and Case Western Reserve to administer
the trust locally. Nonetheless, government ownership need not present
any undue difficulties. Congress could pursue two different avenues
here. First, the government could vest both parties with joint title and
require them to negotiate a good-faith royalties sharing agreement.
Second, after careful study, Congress could similarly vest both parties
with joint title but could then simply stipulate what would amount to
an equitable split between the recipient and provider institutions (e.g.,
70 percent-30 percent of any future royalties).20
Seen in the pro-commercialization light of Bayh-Dole, such
solutions would actually improve upon the current practice as
embodied in the Master Agreement Regarding Use of the Uniform
Biological Material Transfer Agreement ("UBMTA") which the
Office of Technology Transfer currently employs. 0 The UBMTA
provides a regulatory model for the MTAs that university
biorepositories already uniformiy utilize. Keeping with the above
example, the UBMTA would require the recipient organization, Case
Western Reserve, to negotiate a licensing deal with the provider
201 Insofar as it would limit overall transaction costs, the second option might prove
preferable but Congress would need to gather more data to make a definitive determination.2(12Office of Technology Transfer, Nat'l Inst. of Health, Uniform Biological Material
Transfer Agreement (Mar. 8 1995), available at http://ott.od.nih.gov/NewPages/UBMTA.pdf.
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organization, Harvard, which the latter could then always refuse.203
Contrary to Bayh-Dole, this possibility of provider refusal presents a
stumbling block to potential commercialization. Under a Bayh-Dole
compatible trust regime, Congress could require the parties to reach
an equitable agreement (or stipulate the contents thereof) and then
take reasonable steps towards commercialization. If the parties failed
to do so then they would face the possibility of a loss of title via the
government's exercise of its march-in rights, If anything, then a
public tissue trust would seemingly advance rather than retard Bayh-
Dole's goal of commercialization.
Before turning to the next section, an important caveat deserves
re-emphasizing. Commercial product development involving human
tissue samples is a rare occurrence.2 0" Scientists employ the vast
majority of human tissue samples in basic research that is not
commercially viable. Thus, Bayb-Dole concerns aside, any
policymaker should view the commercial development of products
arising out of federally-funded research involving human tissue as the
exception rather than the rule.
IV. A PUBLIC TISSUE TRUST AND THE PROTECTION OF INFORMED
CONSENT
Any proposed trust regime must adequately protect the informied
consent of research participants. Not only is such protection necessary
out of respect for the inherent dignity of research participants, but
purely pragmatic concerns loom equally large. An absence of
adequate consent leads to widespread distrust amongst potential
research participants and a corresponding deep reluctance to dedicate
their tissue for biomedical research .20 ' Hence, proper informed
consent here is necessary to ensure the adequate procurement of the
,,206
raw materials "essential to the success of modern medicine.
As noted above, the right to informed consent to biomedical
research comprises two basic liberty interests: (1) a right of first
refusal, i.e., a right not to participate in biomedical research at all; and
(2) a revocability right, i.e., a night to withdrawal from research
regardless of prior consent to participate. In what follows, this Note
provides a brief historical overview of the right to informed consent, a
203Id. §§ 11(6)-47).
204OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT TASK FORCE, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS 13 (1988).
205See WEIR & OLICK, supra note 14, at 26-31 (discussing public opinion on the use of
human tissue for biomedical research).206Id. at 3.
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discussion of the "Common Rule," 0  and an argument to show the
proposed trust's compatibility with the Common Rule.
A. Historical Overview
Foundationally, the doctrine of informed consent exists to protect
the intrinsic moral worth and inherent dignity of patients and research
participants. The doctrine takes seriously the Kantian dictum that
each autonomous, rational being is a "member in the kingdom of
ends." 0  In order to make autonomous decisions, research
participants need access to accurate and truthful information. As the
district court found in In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation,20
"[wjhen a person is purposefully misled about .. . crucial facts ...
he can no longer be said to exercise that degree of free will that is
essential to the notion of voluntariness. 0 In the absence of such
"crucial facts," researchers can easily reduce research participants to a
means to an end.21 In doing so, the researcher treats the research
participant as a thing or an object as opposed to a person. As Isaiah
Berlin eloquently observed, "[tlo manipulate men, to propel them
towards goals which you-the social reformer-see, but they may
not, is to deny their human essence, to treat them as objects without
wills of their own, and therefore to degrade them."2 12 Properly
protected, a right to informed consent prevents such degradation from
transpiring.
From an ethical perspective, the Nuremberg Code, the Helsinki
Declaration, and the Belmont Report all embody the doctrine of
informed consent at their core. The first sentence of the Nuremberg
Code reads: "The voluntary consent of the human subject is
absolutely essential ."22t  The Helsinki Declaration emphasizes that
research participation "must be voluntary" and the participant must be
"adequately informed. 214 Further, research participants "must be
informed of the right to refuse to participate in the study or to
withdraw consent to participate at any time without reprisal. 1  In the
201 Protection of Human Subjects, 45 c.F.R. § 46.116 (2008).
208 KANT, supra note 35, at 64.
209 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
2101d. at 812.
2 11 JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE 283-84 (2d ed. 2001).
212 ISAIAH BERLIN, FouR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 137 (1969).
2 13 Nuremburg Code (1949), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines
/nuremburg.htmld.
214 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical
Research Involving Human Subjects I B(22), (24) (1964, last amended 2008), available at
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/pdf/lI7c.pdf.215Id. I B(24).
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Belmont Report, the authors stress that "the importance of informed
consent is unquestioned . 1  Succinctly, "[rlespect for persons
requires that subjects . . . be given the opportunity to choose what
shall or shall not happen to them."2 1 1
While lacking the force of law, the Nuremburg Code, the Helsinki
Declaration, and the Belmont Report nevertheless constitute the moral
compass of modern biomedical research. Whether taken singly or
together, these ethical statements enjoin members of the research
community to place the voluntary consent of research participants
above all else-including scientific progress. Researcher behavior
that transgresses either the substance or the spirit of these documents
is, in turn, immediately suspect.
From a legal perspective, a long line of court cases reflects these
ethical concerns. Most famously, in Schloendorff v. Society of New
York Hospital,2t Judge Cardozo declared that "[elvery human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body.",219 In Canterbury v. Spence, 220 the appellate
court predicated its landmark decision on the "patient's right of
self-determination" and the "patient's right of self-decision. 1
Explicitly following Schloendorff, the Canterbury court observed that
"[timue consent to what happens to one's self is the informed exercise
of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably
the options available and the risks attendant upon each." 2  As Faden
and Beauchamp note, Canterbury stands for the proposition that
"self-determination is the sole justification and goal of informed
consent."223 Similarly, in Superintendent of Beichertown State School
v. SaikeWicz, 224 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reasoned that the law developed the doctrine of informed consent as a
way to protect the "individual interest in preserving 'the inviolability
of his person."' 22 ' Respect for personal autonomy is a "concept,
fundamental in American jurisprudence., 22 6
216 Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Research, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,195 (Apr. 18, 1979).
217 Id.
218211 N.Y. 125 (1914), abrogated by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3(N.Y. 1957).
2
Y) Id. at 129.
22-464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cit. 1972).
221 Id. at 784, 786.
222 Id. at 780.
223 RUTH R. FADEN & Tom L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 137 (1986).
224 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
225SId. at 424 (quoting Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (1905), affid, 79 N.E. 562 (11.
1906)).226 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780.
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While the previous cases addressed informed consent within a
clinical context, In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation considers
227informed consent for research purposes. The case involved poorly
educated, cancer-stricken (but not terminally ill) African-Americans
whom researchers exposed to very high levels of radiation, thereby
inducing severe nausea and vomiting. 2 The researchers deceived
their subjects into believing that the radiation "treatments" were for
therapeutic as opposed to experimental purposes .229 The district court
found that constitutional due process considerations prohibited such
egregiously deceptive practices on the part of researchers. 3
Specifically, "[i]f the Constitution protects 'personal autonomy in
making certain types of important decisions,' the decision whether to
participate in the Human Radiation Experiments was one that each
individual Plaintiff was entitled to make freely and with full
knowledge of the purpose and attendant circumstances involved.",23 1
B. The Common Rule
The "Common Rule" refers to Title 45, Part 46 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, entitled "Protection of Human Subjects." The
Common Rule constitutes perhaps the most important American legal
authority concerning the proper treatment of research participants. 3
It governs all research institutions that receive federal funding. The
Common Rule requires such institutions to create MRBs charged with
overseeing all research involving human subjects. Specifically, IRBs
exist "to safeguard the rights and welfare of human research
subjects. 3  An MR must have at least five members, one of whom is
a scientist and one of whom is not affiliated with the institution.2
The Common Rule invests IRBs with wide latitude to approve or
disapprove of research protocols involving human subjects .2 35
A core function of lIRBs is to ensure adequate informed consent.
IRBs do so through "conducting ... initial and continuing review~s]
of research." 236 The Common Rule provides a comprehensive, eight-
227 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995); see also Stadt v. Univ. of Rochester, 921 F. Supp.
1023, 1027 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[Tlhis case does not involve the right to refuse medical
treatment, but instead, the right to be free from non-consensual experimentation on one's
body ... )
22 nre Cincinnati, 874 F. Supp. at 803.
230 1d. at 810-12.
231 Id. at 812 (citation omitted) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
232WEIR & OLICK, supra note 14, at 135.
233 LEVINE, supra note 82, at 211.
23445 C.F.R. § 46. 107(c)-(d) (2008).
235Id. § 46.109(a).
236 1d. § 46.103(b)(4)(i); see also id. § 46.109(b)-(c), (e). The Common Rule also requires
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element test to determine the adequacy of informed consent. These
elements comprise the "core disclosures for research. 3  Specifically,
researchers must provide research participants with the following
information in writing: (1) the purpose, nature, and expected duration
of the research; (2) the likely risks of participation; (3) the likely
benefits to the individual or to society at large of participation; (4) a
disclosure of any alternatives (in the case of clinical research); (5) the
extent to which researchers can maintain participant confidentiality;
(6) whether researchers will provide compensation for participant
injury (where research involves more than minimal risk); (7)
researcher contact information with whom participants may raise any
concerns or inquire further as to their rights; and crucially (8) "[a]
statement that participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will
involve no penalty. ... and the subject may discontinue participation
at any time without penalty."238
The Common Rule, however, also allows LRBs to permit a much
less rigorous, much more general consent process "which does not
include, or which alters, some or all of the elements of informed
consent set forth in this section. 239 To qualify for the weaker consent
procedure, the proposed research must meet the following four
elements: (1) the research entails "no more than minimal risk"; (2) a
weaker consent procedure will not undermine the rights of the
research participants; (3) unless the researcher employs the weaker
standard, the research is not practically possible; and (4) researchers
must provide participants with "additional pertinent information after
participation" if appropriate. 240 Under general consent, researchers
need not provide research participants with detailed information
concerning the research study. Thus, when both minimal risk and
extreme impracticality obtain, the Common Rule permits researchers
to shift from informed to general or simple consent.
C. Compatibility with a Public Tissue Trust
Although the Department of Health and Human Services drafted
the Common Rule to protect research participants qua experimental
subjects, its reach clearly extends to research participants qua tissue
proper documentation of consent. Id. § 46.117(a).
M 7WEIR & OLICK, supra note 14, at 135 (emphasis removed); see also BERG Er AL., supra
note 211, at 249-78 (providing a detailed overview of the genesis and concept of informed
consent embodied in the Common Rule).
23845 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1)-(8) (emphasis added).239 Id. § 46.116(d).
240Id.
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donors .2 4' Luckily, the proposed public tissue trust is clearly
compatible with the Common Rule. Indeed, a revocable trust analysis
is far superior to the gift analysis favored by the courts. As noted
above, a gift analysis is inconsistent with a genuine right of
revocability. Under a trust regime, MB overview could ensure that no
adverse treatment would occur if a patient or research participant
refused to provide a tissue sample. Further, the trust could contact
research participants in writing on a routine basis (e.g., once per year)
to ascertain whether the continued use of a dedicated tissue sample
remained permissible. Again, and in line with the Common Rule,
research participants could then easily request that the trust destroy
their tissue sample (or at least remove it from research consideration).
As discussed throughout this Note, the proposed public tissue trust
thus squares nicely with the first refusal and revocability rights
essential to the doctrine of informed consent.
Further, a trust regime offers a standardized, uniform way to deal
with four tricky consent issues involving human tissue research. First,
a tissue trust offers Congress the unique opportunity to impose a
uniform standard of disclosure on researchers with regard to research
involving human tissue. As Weir and Olick observe, the Common
Rule does not provide researchers with a standard of disclosure to
determine, for example, the materiality of risk to a research
participant. 4 This task belongs to the state courts. State courts have
traditionally recognized two different standards: (1) the professional
standard; and (2) the reasonable person standard24 Some jurists and
bioethicists also advocate a third approach, the subjective standard .244
Hamilton v. Bares245 provides a typical take on the professional
standard. 4 Therein, the court held that the "duty to obtain informed
consent is measured by what information would ordinarily be
provided to the patient under like circumstances by health care
providers engaged in a similar practice in the locality or in similar
241 See WEIR & OLICK, supra note 14, at 48.
242 Id. at 13 5.
243 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 129, at 80-83.
244 Id. Isolated instances of case law also apparently gesture in this direction. See Scott v.
Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979). The court held that "the scope of a physician's
communications must be measured by his patient's need to know enough to enable him to make
an intelligent choice.. .. There is no bright line separating the material from the immaterial; it is
a question of fact. A risk is material if it would be likely to affect patient's decision." Id. While
seeming to embrace a subjective standard, the Scott court did so in the context of Canterbury,
which stands fur an objective reasonable patient standard. Further, the Scott court only criticized
the professional standard. Hence, the Scott court's ultimate position remains unclear.
245 678 N~W.2d 74 (Neb. 2004).
246See id. at 8 1.
20091 211
1212 ~CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REWIEW Io.5:
localities. 4  This standard thus looks to the common practice of the
relevant professionals to determine what information requires
disclosure.
In contrast, the reasonable person standard and the subjective
standard look to the patient/research participant. Canterbury is the
locus classicus for the former: "'La] risk is . . . material when a
reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to be
the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk
... in deciding whether or not to forgo the proposed therapy."' 248 The
Canterbury court thus relies upon an objective standard to determine
whether sufficient disclosure has occurred. Lastly, the subjective
standard emphasizes the individual patient/research participant.
Here, what really matters is the idiosyncratic values and desires
of each particular patient or research participant. 249  Ideally,
physicians/researchers should tailor the consent process to the
subjective needs of their individual patients/research participants.
Which standard best applies when dealing with research
participants who might serve as a source of human tissue? Weir and
Olick make a strong case for the employment of the reasonable
person standard. This standard's especially distinct advantage is that
"it fits equally well as a standard for disclosure in clinical settings,
research settings, or in settings that involve a blending of
clinical/research roles."250  Aside from its applicability across
contexts, the reasonable person standard exhibits other virtues as well.
Contrary to the aim of informed consent, the professional standard
puts researchers and physicians in the driver's seat as opposed to
research participants and patients. In doing so, this standard may
"subvert[] the [lpatient' s] right of autonomous choice. 25 1 Further, the
standard's emphasis on a local community of professionals can lead
to highly relativistic results and permit standards of disclosure to vary
widely across institutions and localities. 5 Researchers could
essentially create a very weak standard of disclosure whereby all that
would matter is consistency with the prevailing disclosure standards
in the relevant local research community. In contrast, the reasonable
person standard offers the best chance to ensure that "the patient's
247Id.
248 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (first alteration in original)
(quoting Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to The rapy, 64 Nw. U. L.
REV. 628, 640 (1970)).
241 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 129, at 83. The subjective standard is primarily
an academic creation.
250WEIR & OLICK, supra note 14, at 24 1.
251 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 129, at 82.
252WEIR & OLICK, supra note 14, at 240.
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right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal.
Specifically, "[lhe scope of the physician's [or researcher's]
communications to the patient . .. must be measured by the patient's
[or research participant's] need, and that need is the information
,,254
material to the decision.
At the other extreme, the subjective standard seemingly requires
too much of researchers and fits poorly within the research context.255
The vast majority of researchers do not have intimate relationships
with research participants. Thus, the subjective standard would
require researchers to expend tremendous time and energy to acquaint
themselves with research participants' values and desires-a
decidedly counterproductive result. Indeed, in many cases such a
relationship would not even prove possible as researchers often have
no contact with research participants who donated tissue long ago.
In the present context, the reasonable person standard provides the
best option. On the one hand, with its focus on objectivity, the
reasonable person standard fits well with the often quite tenuous
interpersonal link between researcher and research participant. On the
other, with its focus on the research participant, the reasonable person
standard offers research participants a level of protection not found in
the professional standard. Given these benefits, as part of legislation
enacting a tissue trust, Congress could insert a provision requiring a
reasonable person standard of disclosure. Only under the auspices of a
national tissue trust could such a uniform standard arise. Otherwise,
research participants are left to the vicissitudes of state disclosure
laws, many of which rely solely on the professional standard
regardless of the clinical or research context.
Second, a public tissue trust would allow for a uniform approach
to protecting the "identity status" of research participants. 5
Currently, a debate rages over the extent to which researchers and
others ought to have access to the identity of tissue donors. 5
Depending upon the policy of the local institution, researchers may
currently employ "identified" samples (the sample container features
the name of the donor), "coded" samples (the sample container
features a numerical code that links to the name of the donor stored in
a computer database), "anonymous" samples (samples collected
253 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786.254Id. (footnote umnitted).
255 WEIR & OLICK, supra note 14, at 242.256Id. at 48.
257 Id. at 140-43.
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without any identifiers), and "anonymized" samples (samples from
which researchers stripped the original identifiers). 5
Any of these options poses risks to research participants.
Inadequate protection of identity status through the use of only
identified samples may lead to an increased risk of breaches of
confidentiality and genetic discrimination .259 The use of anonymized
samples means that researchers will lack the ability to contact
research participants about personal health risks discovered during
research or about the use of their tissue to develop commercial
products .260 As part of any consent process, researchers need to
26
explain these risks thoroughly to research participants. 61Whatever
approach policymakers adopt to address the identity status problem, a
public tissue trust would at least insure a uniform policy that would
cover well over 170 million stored tissue samples. 6 For instance, the
trust could require researchers to "code" all collected samples unless
research participants decided otherwise. 6
Third, a public tissue trust would also provide policymnakers with a
uniformn way to handle retrospective studies involving human tissue
research. Briefly, scientists may currently conduct research involving
human tissue either prospectively or retrospectively.& In prospective
studies, the researchers designed their protocol prior to acquiring the
tissue sample. In retrospective studies, researchers employ archived
tissue originally collected for some other therapeutic or research
purpose. 6
Properly conducted, prospective studies easily pass the Common
Rule's eight-element consent test while retrospective studies clearly
do not. In the latter instance, neither patients, research participants,
nor the original researchers themselves, knew of the future research
that would eventually employ the collected samples. As such, the
258 Id. at 48.
259 But see id. at 34 (stating that "genetic discrimination is a rare occurrence" and fears of
its imminence are "greatly exaggerated").
260See id. at 144.
261 Ellen Wright Clayton et al., Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored Tissue
Samples, 274 JAMA 1786, 1791 (1995).
262 This figure is derived from tallying the collections of all of the biorepositories listed by
Eiseman and Haga which would fall under the scope of the proposed trust. See EisEmAN &
HAGA, supra note 1, at 137-39.
263 Unless samples are at least coded, research participants lose the ability to withdraw the
use of their tissue from research for the simple reason that researchers can no longer link
research participants' samples to them.
2(A See WEIR & OLICK, supra note 14, at 47-48.
265 Post-diagnostic tissue research, i.e., samples collected for therapeutic purposes and
subsequently used in research, pose a particularly thorny problem in the case of retrospective
studies. Id. at 49.
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tissue donors failed to give their informned consent to the use of their
samples in such research.
Many researchers and ethicists argue that a doctrine of general or
"simple consent" should control here.26 Given the minimal risk to
research participants and the practical difficulties of re-consenting,
these scholars claim that the Common Rule clearly permits the
loosening of informed consent in this context. 267 Other scholars
vehemently disagree and demand that researchers seek new, informed
consent each time they employ tissue samples in retrospective
studies.26 Definitive solutions prove elusive. Again, a public tissue
trust nevertheless offers a consistent approach to the difficulty,
whichever option policymnakers ultimately endorse. And, under a
limited revocability trust regime, research participants would still
retain their first refusal and revocability rights, regardless of whether
researchers employed inform-ed or general/simple consent.
Fourth, many research participants want to choose the type of
research done with their tissue. For instance, a cancer sufferer might
choose to provide tissue for research but only if researchers promise
to employ the sample in cancer studies. Some professional research
societies, such as the College of American Pathologists, reject this
option out of hand .269 The fear is that allowing research participants to
make such choices will enable them to exert too much control over
research .270 Researchers, and not research participants, the argument
runs, are in much better position to determine the best of tissue
samples in research. So empowering research participants thus
apparently threatens to undermine biomedical progress.
The advent of a public tissue trust might well allay some of these
fears and provide research participants with more control over the
future use of their samples, thereby enhancing the informed consent
process. Succinctly, several biorepositories specialize in the tissue
samples they store, e.g., prostate tissue, brain tissue, tumors, et 27 1
Research participants who were adamant that researchers only use
their tissue "to find a cure for cancer" need not have their desires
stymied. A researcher could still collect a sample for the appropriate
biorepository. Since every researcher who engaged in bona fide
research would have a ight of access to the trust, research participant
266 Grizzle et al., supra note 116, at 299.
267 WEIR & OLICK, supra note 14, at 57-59.
266 American College of Medical Genetics Storage of Genetics Materials Committee,
Statement on Storage and Use of Genetic Materials, 57 Am. J. Humv. GENETICS 1499 (1995).
269 Grizzle et al., supra note 116, at 298-99.
270 Id.
271 EISEMAN & HAGA, supra note 1, at 46-77.
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selectivity need not undermine biomedical progress. Administrators
of the trust might still have to set limits, however, should too many
research participants choose to "specialize."
In sum, the proposed public tissue trust need not in any way
conflict with the Common Rule. A limited revocability trust would
clearly allow research participants to exercise their rights to first
refusal and revocability, provide a uniform approach to the informed
consent process, and grant research participants more control over the
final disposition of their dedicated tissue.
V. COMMERCIALIZATION
What legal rights, if any, do research participants retain if
researchers develop a commercially viable biomedical product from
their tissue? Sketching an answer to this question requires a brief
foray into biomedical commercialization. Presumably, researchers
should disclose the possibility of commercialization to potential
272research participants as part of the consent process. As both Moore
and Greenberg aptly illustrate, lucrative commercialization ventures
involving human tissue, though rare, occasionally obtain. Basic
fairness seemingly demands that those who originally provided the
raw biomnaterial for such ventures receive some sort of compensation.
Indeed, while many research participants would continue to dedicate
tissue regardless of potential recompense, many might not. Further, if
spectacular commercial successes were to occur, but research
participants were left out in the cold, a subsequent chilling effect on
tissue dedication might well occur. Two types of concerns require
resolution: (1) Moore worries; and (2) Greenberg worries. In what
follows, this Note succinctly attempts to allay both types of fears.
Moore worries: In Moore, the majority denied the plaintiff's
conversion action against researchers who, without the plaintiffs
consent, employed his tissue to develop several commercial products
with an estimated market value of three billion dollars. 7 An
important underlying issue in the case is what one might term the
"non-fungibility" of Moore's tissue. Specifically, Moore was an
over-producer of T-lymphokines. Moore (as well as Ted Slavin) was
the biological equivalent of a "needle in a haystack."27 4 At the time,
his over-producer status rendered him unique. His cells (infected with
272 Researchers also need to inform research participants that if they consent to
anonymization of their samples at the outset, it will prove impossible to contact them should
successful commercialization involving their tissue occur.
273 Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 482 (Cal. 1990).
27,1d. at 482 n.2.
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a virus that caused the anomaly) were not fungible with the cells of
his biological peers, i.e., the rest of us, relative to their virally
enhanced ability to over produce T-lymphokines. Moore was
essentially biologically irreplaceable. He was clearly the sui generis
"but-for" cause of all of the products developed from his patented cell
line (ironically named after him even though he retained absolutely
no claim to it).275 Not unlike a supermodel or an amazing athlete,
Mother Nature endowed Moore with a unique natural gift. Thus, the
decision to deny him any compensation for his deceptively obtained
contribution of unique raw material strikes many laypeople and
276professionals as decidedly unfair.
Further, the difficulties the majority raised in Moore are not
metaphysical conundrums of the sort a court confronts in a wrongful
life action. The deep worry for the Moore court is judicial
overreaching. 7 The majority readily admits that the legislature could
easily pass a law superseding their decision and statutorily expand the
concept of conversion to accommodate Moore. 7 Should it choose to
create a public tissue trust, Congress ought to include a detailed
commercialization provision. The provision should require patent
holders to provide some amount of compensation to those research
participants whose biologically unique tissue constitutes the raw
material of a profitable biomedical product.
Basic fairness seemingly provides an intuitive justification for an
equitable compensation scheme. After all, why should researchers,
universities, and biotech firms reap profits while biologically unique
research participants get nothing? The average person and potential
research participant may well choose not to dedicate tissue to a trust
which provides everyone but them with the possibility of financial
benefit. Sufficiently widespread, such disillusionment amongst
potential research participants would bode ill for biomedical
progress-regardless of the overall rarity of such cases as Moore.
Importantly, Congress could follow Justice Arabian's concluding
dicta and devise a compensation scheme that would award an
equitable percentage of the profits/lump sum payment to the John
Moores and Ted Slavins amongst the trust's settlors.27
Greenberg worries: In Greenberg, the court refused to dismiss a
claim of unjust enrichment against the defendant researchers and
research institutions. The defendants misled plaintiffs by employing
275 Id. at 511 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
276 WEIR & OLICK, supra note 14, at 162-65.
277 Moore, 793 P.2d at 498 (Arabian, J., concurring).
278 Id. at 488 (majority opinion).
279 Id. at 498 (Arabian, J., concurring).
20091 217
1218 ~CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [o.5:
their tissue samples and other resources to derive a diagnostic test for
an "orphan" genetic disorder, Canavan' s disease. Here, unlike Moore,
the tissue involved in developing a marketable commercial product
was fungible (at least relative to the universe of persons bearing the
Canavan's gene). In other words, tissue from any Canavan's carrier
would have been sufficient. One can easily bring more expansive
"fungibility" scenarios to mind. Imagine that the tissue sample
utilized to develop a cure for prostate cancer could have come from
any prostate. In this hypothetical, full fungibility across all prostate
tissue would obtain.
Here, the claim for personal compensation for research participants
appears much weaker than in Moore. The lack of biological
uniqueness makes it impossible for such research participants to claim
"without me, no commercial product would exist." Nonetheless,
Congress could find a form of indirect compensation to be in order.
That is, the trust could require the developers of commercially
successful, biomedical products from fungible tissue samples to put a
percentage of their profits back into the trust. Such a provision could
then assuage any fears that the trust existed to benefit a few
technologically savvy elites, as opposed to the public at large.
CONCLUSION
In sum, a national tissue trust offers the best available solution to
the ethical, legal, and policy challenges posed by human tissue
ownership. Such a trust would uniquely serve the interests of two
overriding yet potentially conflicting policy goals: ensuring
biomedical progress and protecting informed consent. A limited
revocability trust offers a way to provide the requisite archival
stability essential to biomedical progress while simultaneously
affording research participants the right to revoke their consent to
continued use of their dedicated tissue in research. Clearly, a trust
theory cannot completely resolve the tension between these two
goals. But this apparently less than optimal result is a cause for relief
and not worry. By focusing exclusively on one policy goal at the
expense of the other, both the gift and the bailment theories prove
decidedly unsatisfactory. A gift analysis eviscerates meaningful
informed consent while a bailment theory induces radical archival
instability. Instead, a trust theory both forges a suitable compromise
between its erstwhile rivals and also invites a new way of
conceptualizing human tissue ownership. With the advent of a tissue
trust, what was once yours or mine becomes ours: a shared national
1218 Vol. 59:4
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treasure to make our lives, and the lives of future generations, better
off.
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